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The Order of Knowing: Juan Luis Vives on
Language, Thought, and the Topics
Lodi Nauta
I. INTRODUCTION
Friend of Erasmus and Thomas More, the Spanish humanist Juan Luis
Vives (1492–1540) was a prominent voice in sixteenth-century debates on
language and learning between humanists and Scholastics. His vast oeuvre
includes the highly polemical Against the Pseudodialecticians on the lan-
guage and methods of the Scholastics, and his massive encyclopedia of the
arts, De disciplinis, in twenty books. The two principal sections of De
disciplinis—a critique of the Aristotelian Organon and of some later medie-
val developments (De causis corruptarum artium) and a theory of educa-
tion (De tradendis disciplinis)—were complemented by a series of smaller
treatises on rhetoric and dialectic.1 Together with his major work on rheto-
ric, De ratione dicendi, they form the backbone of Vives’s program of lin-
guistic and educational reform. Dealing with various aspects of language,
speech, argumentation, and composition, they contain valuable insights on
language and its crucial role in human society, culture, and in the acquisi-
tion of knowledge.
1 See Peter Mack, ‘‘Vives’s Contributions to Rhetoric and Dialectic,’’ in A Companion to
Juan Luis Vives, ed. Charles Fantazzi (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 227–76 for an excellent dis-
cussion of these works. Unless otherwise stated all references are to Gregorio Mayans y
Siscar’s edition, J. L. Vives, Opera Omnia (8 vols., Valencia, 1782–90; repr. London,
1964), henceforth abbreviated as M.
PAGE 325
Copyright  by Journal of the History of Ideas, Volume 76, Number 3 (July 2015)
325
................. 18753$ $CH1 06-23-15 15:34:46 PS
JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS ✦ JULY 2015
Scholars do not always agree on the originality and significance of
Vives’s contributions to these fields, however. For some he is ‘‘one of the
most original philosophers of language’’ of the Renaissance, who even
comes close to anticipating modern logical achievements such as Bertrand
Russell’s type theory or John Lyons’s semantics.2 For others he is a timid,
half-hearted follower of Lorenzo Valla (ca. 1406–57), whose views on lan-
guage and knowledge were congenial to Vives, yet apparently too radical
for him to endorse.3 Other scholars also agree that Vives was not very inno-
vative in dialectics but nevertheless think that his work embodies ‘‘an origi-
nal, unified and distinctively sixteenth-century account of the art of
thinking and composition, articulated in a set of related moves,’’ pointing
especially to Vives’s original observations on rhetorical themes such as
style, decorum, emotional manipulation, and forms of writing.4 And while
historians of logic and medieval philosophy are generally negative about
the contributions to dialectic by humanists such as Vives, who has thrown
out ‘‘the good with the bad,’’5 historians of Renaissance humanism, on the
other hand, have praised him for what they see as a radical break with
Scholasticism, and his insistence on the historical embeddedness of lan-
guage and human culture.6
It is not surprising that scholars have interpreted Vives’s position in
different ways. Standing between medieval and modern times, between old
and new modes of thinking and writing, and living at a time when Aristote-
lian Scholasticism had come under attack but the new science and philoso-
phy had not yet crystallized, it is only to be expected that we find a certain
ambivalence toward the traditional and the more innovative expressions of
Vives’s philosophical ideas. For instance, his formulations sometimes sug-
gest a passive role for language, but the rhetorician in Vives realized that
language could take on an active role, shaping the way we think, feel, and
2 Eugenio Coseriu, ‘‘Zur Sprachtheorie von Juan Luis Vives,’’ in Aus der franzo¨sischen
Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte. Festschrift Walter Mo¨nch (Heidelberg: Kerle, 1971), 234–
55, on 234 and 254; H. E. Brekle, Einfu¨hrung in die Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft
(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1985), 109, n. 127.
3 Richard Waswo, Language and Meaning in the Renaissance (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1987), 113–33.
4 Mack, ‘‘Vives’s Contributions,’’ 242.
5 Alexander Broadie, Introduction to Medieval Logic, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1993), 197. Cf. William Kneale and Martha Kneale, The Development of
Logic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), 298–316.
6 See several contributions to A Companion to Juan Luis Vives, including Fantazzi’s intro-
duction, with full bibliography; Valerio Del Nero, Linguaggio e filosofia in Vives. L’or-
ganizzazione del sapere nel ‘‘De disciplinis’’ (1531) (Bologna: CLUEB, 1991); Carlos G.
Noren˜a, Juan Luis Vives (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970).
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hence respond to the world. And while some of his formulations suggest a
belief in a stable order of essences, independent of human categorization,
other formulations seem to give priority to the shaping power of the human
mind, governed by the topics (loci). At times Vives can sound like a realist,
while he also sometimes endorses a nominalist position.
Building on much excellent recent work on Vives, I will try to locate
these philosophical ‘‘tensions’’ against the background of his critique of
what he regarded as the useless and misleading abstractions of Scholastic-
Aristotelian thought. Like other humanists, Vives was convinced that the
Scholastics’ metaphysical and logical apparatus, expressed in abstract and
technical language, had blocked our view of the world of concrete individ-
ual things. For him linguistic and philosophical abstraction were thus two
sides of the same coin, and his program of educational and linguistic
reform, greatly inspired by classical rhetoric and by his predecessors Valla
and Rudolph Agricola (1444–85), was aimed at clearing away what he
(rightly or not) regarded as Scholastic abstractions in order to return to the
world of concrete things (res), described in a language that matches our
experience of this world. From a more general point of view, Vives’s ideas
on language, knowledge, and the role which the topics play as organizing
principles of knowledge can thus be taken as an illustration of a wider trend
that scholars have observed in the Renaissance: a move, often antimeta-
physical in spirit, away from the abstract and the general toward the con-
crete, the singular, and the empirical.7
II. KNOWLEDGE AND LANGUAGE AS FUNCTIONS
OF MAN’S NATURAL CONDITION
A central feature of Vives’s views of language and knowledge is his insis-
tence that they are functions of man’s biological nature. In several places in
his works Vives starts therefore with a brief sketch of the early origins of
human civilization to show how acquisition of knowledge and the develop-
ment of language to communicate that knowledge are grounded in man’s
natural condition governed by the principle that they seek the good and
avoid the harmful. From distinguishing harmful from beneficial food to the
7 E.g., Panagiotis Kondylis, Die neuzeitliche Metaphysikkritik (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta,
1990). B. W. Ogilvie, The Science of Describing: Natural History in Renaissance Europe
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). Eckhard Kessler, ‘‘Humanismus und
Naturwissenschaft bei Rudolf Agricola,’’ in L’Humanisme allemand (1480–1540)
(Munich: Fink, 1979), 141–57.
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invention of crafts and arts, man’s ingenium—as Vives stresses—was cru-
cial in securing a safe place in a dangerous world and in building up social
communities when humans left their caves. Though speaking here only of
human beings, Vives generally follows the common wisdom that all living
creatures have a natural inclination toward self-preservation, and that the
emotions—in themselves neither good nor bad—play a vital role in avoid-
ing the harmful and seeking the beneficial.8 But it was man who was given
a higher rational faculty by God, by which man was able to transcend the
here and now, using reason to inquire into things, to gaze over past, pres-
ent, and future, to ‘‘examine all things, to collect, to compare, and to roam
through the universe of nature as if it were his own possessions.’’9
From these early beginnings man began to build up knowledge, and
this gradual development of knowledge, crafts, the arts, and sciences is a
recurrent theme in Vives’s works. Probably inspired by Aristotle’s Politics
and Cicero’s De inventione, Vives then tells the story of socialization, from
closely-knit families to larger communities that started to build villages and
cities, which required the introduction of laws and government. Obviously,
speech is a crucial element in this story, also grounded in man’s natural
condition.10 Without suggesting that human speech developed out of ani-
mal sounds, as Lucretius did in his De rerum natura, Vives does link the
two together: man shares with animals the uttering of sounds for expressing
feelings and desires (motus quosdam animi et affectiones), and some ani-
mals who live in communities such as bees and ants ‘‘emit signs [signa]
somewhat similar to human speech.’’11 These natural sounds are what
grammarians traditionally called ‘‘interjections,’’ and elsewhere Vives refers
to this category, stating that while sounds in animals are signs of their emo-
tions, in man they are signs of their ‘‘entire mental life [animi universi]:
mind, imagination, emotions, intelligence and the will.’’12
8 De anima et vita 3 (M 3:422–36); a modern edition is M. Sancipriano, De anima et
vita (Padua: Gregoriana, 1974). Cf. C. G. Noren˜a, Juan Luis Vives and the Emotions
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989); Lorenzo Casini, Cognitive and
Moral Psychology in Renaissance Philosophy: A Study of Juan Luis Vives’ De anima et
vita (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2006), 138–59.
9 De tradendis disciplinis 1, 1 (M 6:243); Foster Watson, trans., Vives: On Education
(Cambridge, 1913; repr. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1971), 11; cf. ibid.,
6:298, trans. Watson, Vives: On Education, 90. I also refer to the Italian translation, with
useful notes: L’insegnamento delle discipline, trans. Valerio Del Nero (Florence: Olschki,
2011), 3; cf. 73.
10 Ibid.; cf. De causis corruptarum artium 4, 1 (M 6:152: justice and language).
11 Lucretius De rerum natura book 5, 1028–90; Vives, De ratione dicendi, 1,1 (M 2:93).
A good edition, with Spanish translation, is Vives, Del arte del hablar, ed. J. M. Rodriguez
Peregrina (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2000).
12 De anima et vita 2, 7 (M 3:372) and De censura veri 1 (M 3:143) where Vives adds
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Vives does not offer much speculation on the details of this gradual
development from simple to more complicated forms of language, but he
observes that languages naturally developed from simple to more compli-
cated systems of signs: ‘‘By the help of speech, their minds, which had been
hidden by concentration on bodily needs, began to reveal themselves; single
words [verba singula] were attended to, then phrases and modes of speak-
ing [phrases ac loquendi modi], as they were appropriate for use, i.e. as
they were marked by public agreement of opinion, which is, as it were,
what a mint is to current coin.’’13 Primitive languages are thus characterized
by a simple structure, being almost concatenations of nouns referring to
concrete objects, without syncategorematic words such as ‘‘all,’’ ‘‘if,’’
‘‘and,’’ ‘‘unless,’’ ‘‘only,’’ and ‘‘except.’’ They also generally lacked words
that refer to grammatical and logical categories such as ‘‘noun,’’ ‘‘verb,’’
‘‘syllable,’’ and ‘‘syllogism,’’ for which Vives uses the traditional name of
secondary words (secundaria) or words of words (nominum nomina). Sty-
listic refinements were also not on the minds of early speakers: they spoke
‘‘rambling or disconnected [dissolute] nor did they connect parts of a sen-
tence rhythmically [alligabant numeris].’’14 As the analogy between the
early stage of mankind and that of an individual was never far away from
such thinking, Vives also compares this early language with the language
of children, who likewise do not yet make well-connected sentences; they
use separate words for individual things, without having yet formed
abstract concepts, nor do they use syncategorematic and higher order
words.15
How the process went on Vives does not tell. Like other humanists he
clearly recognizes different forms of Latin in antiquity, and he suggests that
‘‘from Greek discourse came the Latin; from the Latin, the Italian, Spanish,
French were derived,’’ but knowledge of the earliest stages that preceded
the Greek language was a field of speculation into which Vives did not
enter.16 At one point in the De tradendis disciplinis, he refers to ‘‘that origi-
nal language in which Adam attached the names to things’’ and to the diver-
sity of languages as a punishment of sin, but this is an isolated remark and
that some interjections in Latin and Greek may transcend the level of purely natural
sounds and may be regarded as parts of speech.
13 De tradendis disciplinis 1, 1 (M 6:245; trans. Watson, Vives: On Education, 14; trans.
Del Nero, L’insegnamento delle discipline, 5–6); cf. Cicero, De oratore 2.38.159; Quintil-
ian, Institutio oratoria 1.6.3.
14 De ratione dicendi 1, 6 (M 2:116–17).
15 De censura veri I (M 3:144–45); De anima et vita 2, 7 (M 3:369–70; ed. Sancipriano,
De anima et vita, 302); ibid., 2, 8 (3:372; 312).
16 De ratione dicendi I, 1 (M 2:95–96); De tradendis disciplinis 3, 1 (M 6:300–301; trans.
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is not followed up by an attempt to trace words back to a pre-Babylonian
language—an attempt that a contemporary such as Luther would have
deemed fruitless anyway after the radical dispersion of languages after
Babel.17
Usually, Vives emphasizes the natural growth of language, knowledge,
culture, and the arts from their early origins to later times, and though he
does not develop it explicitly his view is that the early rise of language must
be located in the small communities of primitive people who started using
groans, grunts, cries, and other sounds for communicating their feelings,
desires, plans, beliefs, and ideas. Just as the acquisition of knowledge
started as a necessary consequence of man’s natural condition but devel-
oped gradually into systems of arts and sciences, so speech as something
that is natural to us (loqui naturale est nobis) developed into systems of
conventional signs, governed by art and convention.18
III. FUNCTIONS OF LANGUAGE
From Vives’s sketches of the early conditions we can distill a variety of
functions that he assigns to language. Its main function is to be an instru-
ment for thought, that is, an expression of what goes on inside the mind.
Without language our thoughts, ‘‘shut in by the grossness and density of
the body,’’ remain hidden.19 To describe this primary function Vives
employs several metaphors of a rather traditional kind: language as a river
that flows from its source or as water from its fountain, that is the mind; or
words as the body, and thought as the soul and hence as the ‘‘life of words,’’
language as the seat (sedes) of thought or its ‘‘image’’ (imago).20 These met-
aphors suggest that the direction of influence is unilateral: words are used
for expressing what has been thought out by the mind.
Watson, Vives: On Education, 94; Del Nero, L’insegnamento delle discipline, 77) on
derivation of languages.
17 De tradendis disciplinis 3, 1 (M 6:299; trans. Watson, Vives: On Education, 93; Del
Nero, L’insegnamento delle discipline, 74). See Coseriu, ‘‘Zur Sprachtheorie von Juan
Luis Vives,’’ 238, identifying the passage correctly as a ‘‘Fremdko¨rper.’’ Luther, In
primum librum Mosis enarrationes, fol. 169, cited C.-G. Dubois, Mythe et langage au
seizie`me sie`cle (Bordeaux: Ducros, 1970), 53.
18 De tradendis disciplinis 3, 1 (M 6:298; trans. Watson, Vives: On Education, 90, whose
translation, unlike Del Nero’s, overlooks the distinction between speech, which is natural,
and language, which is art: ‘‘loqui naturale est nobis, hanc vero linguam, aut illam artis’’);
Del Nero, L’insegnamento delle discipline, 73.
19 Ibid.
20 De ratione dicendi I, 1 and 2, 1 (M 2:94 and 130); De anima et vita 2, 7 (M 3:371; ed.
Sancipriano, De anima et vita, 308). De tradendis disciplinis 3, 1 (M 6:298; trans. Wat-
son, Vives: On Education, 90; Del Nero, L’insegnamento delle discipline, 73).
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Of course language is not such a neutral verbalization, but it exercises
considerable influence on our mental life, indeed on all aspects of life: ‘‘No
course of life whatever, and no human activity can continue without
speech.’’21 In words that echo ancient rhetoricians but also contemporary
humanists such as Agricola and Giovanni Pontano (1429–1503), Vives
writes that ‘‘emotions of the mind are enflamed by the sparks of speech,
and so too reason is impelled and moved by speech,’’ and thus ‘‘in the
whole kingdom of the activities of man, speech holds in its possession a
mighty strength which it continually manifests.’’ The power of language
also affects our judgment: ‘‘It should have the capacity to explain most
aptly what they think. By its means much power of judgment should be
developed.’’ Language is therefore not the neutral instrument that some
traditional metaphors suggest (such as a servant that serves reason as its
master, or as clothing for the body) but can ‘‘leave stings in the minds of
the audience [in animis audientium],’’ and is thus an active, shaping influ-
ence on our mental and emotional life.22
From the perspective of the community language is not just the expres-
sion of the thoughts of an individual but the social bond that ties people
together. As a humanist with a more than solid grounding in ancient rheto-
ric, Vives underscores frequently the social as well as the socializing effect
of language as praised, e.g., by Cicero. The close link between language and
civilization is a running theme throughout Vives’s De disciplinis (and in
humanist thought generally), which also voices the typically humanist senti-
ment that ignorance and corruption of the Latin language is an important
cause of the downfall of the arts and sciences in the post-classical era. But
while the De disciplinis focuses on Latin as the storehouse of learning and
language of the church, Vives realizes full well that the socializing effects of
language are marked features of any language, even of what he regards as
the gibberish of his Scholastic teachers in Paris, whose identity as a social
group was formed by the bond of their technical terminology. Hence, his
treatise on rhetoric is introduced not as a work on Latin rhetoric but on
rules for effective and sound communication in any language (non unius
modo vel alterius linguae sed in commune omnium), even though obviously
21 De tradendis disciplinis 4, 3 (M 6:356; trans. Watson, Vives: On Education, 181; Del
Nero, L’insegnamento delle discipline, 155). Next quotations 4, 3 and 3, 1 (M 6:356
and 298; trans. Watson, Vives: On Education, 180, 91; Del Nero, L’insegnamento delle
discipline, 154–55; 74).
22 De ratione dicendi 2, 5 (M 2:146). Cicero, De oratore 1.8.30–33; 3.14.15. Cf. Gio-
vanni Pontano, De sermone, ed. S. Lupi and A. Risicato (Lugano: Lucani, 1953), 3–4.
For Vives on emotions see n. 8.
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Latin is his model and his source of inspiration and examples.23 For Vives
the notion of language as instrumentum societatis humanae implies that we
get to know a culture and its learned traditions by studying its language.
Language is the gate to the treasury (sacrarium) of culture and learning,
hence students should ‘‘gain as much of the language as will enable them
to penetrate to those facts and ideas, which are contained in these lan-
guages, like beautiful and valuable things are locked up in treasuries.’’24
Vives does not develop this insight in any anthropological way, much less
arrive at a notion of linguistic relativism. Yet he often refers to the fact, well
known to translators, that every language has ‘‘its own appropriateness of
speech, called idioma by the Greeks,’’25 not to mention its own meaning
and charm (vis et gratia), and that languages obviously have their own
rules, customs, and conventions, e.g., in the use of negatives, in the compo-
sition of words, and in countless other linguistic phenomena.26 Vives’s well-
known emphasis on linguistic custom, though certainly not new with him,
follows directly from his view of language as a social binding force.
We should of course not distinguish too sharply between these func-
tions of language—language as expression of thought, as instrument of the
social bond, as treasure house of learning and culture—because for Vives
these are clearly aspects of one and the same picture. He elucidates this
picture in De ratione dicendi by analyzing four purposes of speech: namely,
to explain, to prove, to move, and to please, derived from the classical three
aims to teach, to move, and to please.27 Interestingly, these functions of
language are presented as a consequence of man’s postlapsarian condition.
In the pristine, ideal situation about which Vives remains vague, communi-
cation was a completely transparent process: speakers expressed themselves
in the clearest terms, listeners understood it perfectly, and there was no
weak link nor manipulation or deceit in this communication of thoughts.28
In the pristine situation, the natural purpose of this God-given gift was just
23 De ratione dicendi 2, 2 (M 2:94). Cf. Pontano, whose aim in De sermone (ed. Lupi and
Risicato, 5) is to deal with common discourse (oratio communis) rather than formal
oratory and rhetoric.
24 De tradendis disciplinis 3, 1 and 4, 1 (M 6:298 and 345, trans. Watson, Vives: On
Education, 91 and 163; Del Nero, L’insegnamento delle discipline, 74, 139).
25 In Pseudo-Dialecticos (M 3:48; 142–43); Juan Luis Vives, In Pseudodialecticos: A Crit-
ical Edition, ed. and trans. Charles Fantazzi (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1979), 56; 59–61; Vives,
Against the Pseudodialecticians: A Humanist Attack on Medieval Logic, trans. Rita Guer-
lac (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979), 68; 134–36.
26 De causis corruptarum artium 3, 6 (M 6:143); In Pseudo-Dialecticos (M 3:47); ed.
Fantazzi, In Pseudodialecticos, 55; Guerlac, Against the Pseudodialecticians, 67.
27 M 2, 11–15 (M 2:155–58).
28 De ratione dicendi, 2, 11 (M 2:156).
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to express one’s thought. The ‘‘natural purpose’’ (naturalis finis) of lan-
guage then is explanation. But ‘‘explanation no longer sufficed’’ after sin
(delictum) had darkened the human mind, and proving and persuading
became necessary tools as ignorance, deceit, partisanship, and confusion
entered human relations. But this does not mean that for Vives language is
a necessary evil: it can be used for evil purposes, but just as the emotions
are neutral in themselves (neutri), so language too is something that can be
used in evil and good ways—already in antiquity a traditional defense of
rhetoric.29 Indeed, the ideal situation seems just that: an ideal, almost hypo-
thetical situation, as humans are not spiritual angels who can just read each
others’ minds. But it does mean that for Vives even more moral weight is
put upon the use of language, language being a vital element in the moral
education of children: just as human behavior should be ruled by reason-
ableness, prudence, modesty, piety, a love for truth, and a regard for the
social and moral well-being of fellow humans, so the use of language should
be geared to these ends and exercised by the same virtues.30
So in itself (in re ipsa) language has just one purpose—to explain—but
related to us (nostri) three: ‘‘to prove, to move, and to keep the attention
of the audience [pascere] by speech.’’31 Inspired by Agricola, Vives divides
explanation into teaching and proving, and describes these functions in
terms often derived from Agricola, whose work he knew well.32 Just like
Agricola, Vives has a keen eye for all the elements that go into effective
communication: ‘‘we have to consider the personality of the speaker and of
the listener, and the nature of the particular business in hand, to decide
what are the means suitable to produce a particular effect in relation to
a particular place and time, having regard to the particular speaker and
listener.’’33 This is true for any kind of situation but in particular in the case
of the emotional appeal of a speech:
Before everything else we must consider who we are and who are
the people whose emotions we wish to arouse or placate, what is
29 Cf. De tradendis disciplinis 4, 3 (M 6:357, trans. Watson, Vives: On Education, 181;
Del Nero, L’insegnamento delle discipline, 155). On emotions being ‘‘neutral’’ (neutri),
see De ratione dicendi 2, 11 (M 2:156).
30 De causis corruptarum artium 4, 1 (M 6:152).
31 De ratione dicendi 2, 11 (M 2:157); cf. De tradendis disciplinis 4, 3 (M 6:357; trans.
Watson, Vives: On Education, 181; Del Nero, L’insegnamento delle discipline, 155).
32 For Vives’s debt to Agricola see Peter Mack, Renaissance Argument. Valla and Agricola
in the Traditions of Rhetoric and Dialectic (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993), 314–19.
33 De tradendis disciplinis 4, 3 (M 6:357, trans. Watson, Vives: On Education, 182; Del
Nero, L’insegnamento delle discipline, 155).
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their judgment of the matter in question, what do they value
greatly, what very little, which emotions are they liable to, which
immune from, out of which emotions do they move easily to which
ones. . . . We must put on their mind and their whole character
while we are thinking about what would benefit our case and we
must put ourselves in their place, that is, we must consider dili-
gently, supposing we were them, that is, if we have the same con-
victions about things as them, by what means we would now be
moved (or placated) in the present business. This act of imagining
[phantasia] is wonderfully adapted for finding out what we must
do.34
Like humanists such as Agricola and Pontano, Vives develops here ideas
that were pivotal elements in ancient rhetoric. The psychological mecha-
nism by which we can recognize mutual emotions and hence can put our-
selves in someone else’s place was well known to ancient orators and
philosophers.35 Vives’s observations are acute, testifying to his great sensi-
tivity to the varied use of language depending on context.
IV. THE ORDER OF KNOWING AND
THE ORDER OF THE WORLD
But while moving and persuading are important in contexts in which a
speaker wants to get his or her audience to believe, accept, or deny a posi-
tion, explaining is important in many other contexts in which we simply
want to make ourselves understood without aiming primarily to create
belief in an audience: ‘‘the aim of this kind of speech is to be understood:
of the speaker truly to explain what he conceives in his mind and conveys
to the hearer.’’36 This might suggest a rather unproblematic correspondence
between man’s cognitive powers, finely adapted to their function, and the
world with which man becomes familiar. But Vives’s optimism about the
cognitive process is at times qualified by his belief that postlapsarian man
cannot know the true essences of things. Before we can discuss Vives’s solu-
tion to bridge the gap between the essential structure of the world and the
34 De ratione dicendi 2, 60 (M 2:165–66); trans. Peter Mack, ‘‘Vives’s De arte dicendi:
Structure, Innovations, Problems,’’ Rhetorica 23 (2005): 81.
35 Cicero, De oratore 3.59.223, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1942), 179; cf. 2.44.189–90; Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 6.2.26. Pontano,
De sermone, ed. Lupi and Risicato, 41.
36 De ratione dicendi 2, 47 (M 2:158); trans. Mack, ‘‘Vives’s De arte dicendi,’’ 80.
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human mind, we must therefore briefly look at his epistemology, which is a
natural outcome of his view of the early origins of man’s cognitive powers.
Vives accepts the Aristotelian theory of the acquisition of knowledge
as a combination of sense perception and reason: based on a careful and
repeated observation of a whole range of phenomena, reason has to take
an inductive step from these observations to general conclusions:
In the beginning, first one, then another experience, through won-
der at its novelty, was noted down for use in life; from a number
of separate experiments the mind gathered a universal law, which,
after support and confirmation by many experiments was consid-
ered certain and established.37
But if the experiments (that is, observations) do not agree with the general
pattern or rule, we (or later generations) should continue the search:
in teaching the arts, we shall collect many experiments and observe
the experience of many teachers, so that from them general rules
may be formed. If some of the experiments do not agree with the
rule, then the reason why this happens must be noted down. If
there are more deviations than agreements or an equal number, a
dogma must not be established from the fact, but the facts must be
transmitted to the astonishment of posterity, so that from
astonishment . . . philosophy may grow.38
As already noticed, Vives thinks this growth of knowledge is the result of a
natural, inborn inclination of man to seek out the beneficial and avoid the
harmful. This principle also explains why we have an inborn sense of good
and bad, and an inner conscience that praises and blames ourselves and
others, and why all people have a notion of a god (Deum esse).39 Indeed
the mind has a ‘‘natural kinship,’’ also called ‘‘affinity,’’ ‘‘friendship,’’ or
‘‘affection,’’ with ‘‘the first principles from which, as from seeds, other
truths proceed.’’40
37 De tradendis disciplinis I, 2 (M 6:250, trans. Watson, Vives: On Education, 20; Del
Nero, L’insegnamento delle discipline, 11).
38 De tradendis disciplinis 2, 4 (M 6:296, trans. Watson, Vives: On Education, 87–88;
Del Nero, L’insegnamento delle discipline, 70).
39 De prima philosophia I (M 3:186).
40 De instrumento probabilitatis (M 3:82); Mack, ‘‘Vives’s Contributions,’’ 245; Noren˜a,
Juan Luis Vives, 249; Casini, Cognitive and Moral Psychology, 40–41, referring to
Cicero, Academica 2.31 and De natura deorum 3.17.
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This Stoic notion of innateness, popularized for instance by Boethius
in his Consolation of Philosophy, had always been a good answer to the
Platonic idea that knowledge is a recollection of things that the soul already
knew before birth. But this optimism is toned down by Vives’s Christian
picture of fallen man. Though duly invoking the prelapsarian condition of
man in which perfect knowledge was possible, Vives does not elaborate on
it, and seems to regard the fallen condition of man as a given, that is, as the
natural situation in which we find ourselves. This condition sets limits on
what we can know, and Vives repeatedly states that we cannot know the
inner essences of things but only sensible qualities. In his early De initiis,
sectis et laudibus philosophiae from 1518, he writes, for instance, that the
New Academy under the leadership of Lacydes and Carneades argued that
‘‘things could not be understood and accordingly that nobody could rightly
affirm or know anything, both because of the inherent difficulty of the
things being studied and because of the frailty and obscurity of the human
mind.’’41 Like his predecessor Agricola who thought that there were many
things about which we do not have certainty, Vives also thinks that we can
reach only probable knowledge: ‘‘What knowledge we have gained can
only be reckoned as probable and not assumed as absolutely true.’’42 In
short, knowledge of essences is at best a well-informed guess or conjecture
on the basis of sense perception, at worst a sheer impossibility. Investiga-
tions of nature can never result in indubitable knowledge and absolute cer-
tainty but are always approximations, the quality of which depends on our
data and our reasoning process.
But how far does this skeptical sentiment go? Here we come to an
important issue in Vives’s thought. Is there such an order of essences ‘‘deep
down,’’ unavailable for the human mind, or is the order as we see it all
there is? If the human mind can reach no deeper than the outer surface of
what we see, it might seem to follow that reality is dependent on our episte-
mic categorizations. And indeed we find Vives frequently stating—and in
this he seems to follow Valla—that knowledge is always dependent on how
we see things and think about them (ex sententia animi nostri censemus,
41 In Vives, Early Writings, ed. C. Matheeussen et al. (Leiden: Brill, 1987), 39; De prima
philosophia I (M 3:194); cf. Casini, Cognitive and Moral Psychology, 36. Agricola, De
inventione dialectica, with Alardus’s commentary (Cologne, 1539; repr. Nieuwkoop,
1967), 2.
42 De tradendis disciplinis 4, 1 (M 6:347–48, trans. Watson, Vives: On Education,
166–67; Del Nero, L’insegnamento delle discipline, 142), but in De prima philosophia
Vives rejects Protagorean relativism (M 3:194).
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non ex rebus ipsis), and on how we judge things to be; how things are in
themselves we cannot know.43
V. TOPICS AS A BRIDGE BETWEEN MIND AND REALITY
Our epistemic categories cannot simply be of our own making; they must
ultimately be grounded in reality. Here is where the topics come in. The
topics, as we know, were a set of places (loci) such as definition, genus,
species, place, time, whole/part, and so on, for inventing arguments. They
had a long and complicated history behind them when Agricola composed
his De inventione dialectica in the late 1470s (published posthumously only
in 1515), in which he organized the rhetorical and dialectical sets into one
system of topical invention, based on the lists of Cicero and Boethius (who
had used that of the Aristotelian Themistius).44 Agricola thus departed from
Boethius who had emphasized the difference between rhetoric and dialectic,
each with its own system of topics, and returned to Cicero’s more flexible,
pragmatic use of the topics. For Agricola the topics formed a logic of
inquiry rather than a system in which the topics as universal propositions
should guarantee the validity of assertions made in an argument. The differ-
ences between Agricola and late-medieval logicians, which cannot be dis-
cussed here, are therefore considerable: in Agricola there is no attempt to
reduce topical arguments to syllogisms (though the force of the syllogism
remains an ideal even for informal arguments45) in the way in which, e.g.,
William of Sherwood and Peter of Spain tried to do, nor do we find a theory
of consequences of a late-terminist kind (as, e.g., in Ockham). Indeed, Agri-
cola rejects Boethius’s topical maxims, while these maxims, whose function
it was to lend power to syllogisms or to complete imperfect syllogisms,
formed an important ingredient in medieval dialectic.46 From the treatments
43 De prima philosophia I (M 3:194); cf. Valla, Dialectical Disputations, ed. and trans.
Brian P. Copenhaver and Lodi Nauta (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
2012), 1:32–34; cf. Lodi Nauta, In Defense of Common Sense: Lorenzo Valla’s Humanist
Critique of Scholastic Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009),
68–71.
44 Mack, Renaissance Argument, 117–67; Marc Cogan, ‘‘Rodolphus Agricola and the
Semantic Revolutions of the History of Invention,’’ Rhetorica 2 (1984): 163–94; Ann
Moss, Printed Commonplace-Books and the Structuring of Renaissance Thought
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 77–80.
45 Mack, Renaissance Argument, 141–42.
46 See Otto Bird, ‘‘The Tradition of the Logical Topics: Aristotle to Ockham,’’ Journal of
the History of Ideas 23 (1962): 307–23, on 313. Eleonore Stump, Dialectic and its Place
in the Development of Medieval Logic (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 135–56
(terminist logicians, esp. Peter of Spain), 253–58 (Ockham). For Boethius’s theory, see
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of Cicero, Quintilian, Boethius, and others, Agricola built his own system,
geared toward finding effective arguments and laying bare the argumenta-
tive structure of texts. It thus enabled the student to organize any type of
discourse and analyze texts in terms of underlying questions and argumen-
tative structure. The vast impact of the De inventione dialectica is telling
evidence of changing intellectual circumstances in the sixteenth century.47
For Agricola, and also for Vives, the topics were thus primarily labels
for arguments that we can use concerning a particular subject matter.48 But
the topics as labels of arguments are derived from a consideration of things
and what things have in common such as substance, quality, action, cause,
and effect, and indeed many of the topics are presented as reflecting the
things themselves. Agricola’s topics, for instance, are divided into ‘‘inter-
nal’’ topics, which are ‘‘within the substance of a thing’’ (e.g., genus, spe-
cies, property/difference, whole, part) or ‘‘bring a certain manner or
disposition to it’’ (adjacents, actions, subject), and ‘‘external’’ topics, which
refer to ‘‘necessarily joined aspects’’ (e.g., causes, effects, place, time), and
so on.49 What Vives learned from Agricola (and the Ciceronian-Boethian
tradition on which the latter was based) was to see the topics not just as
places of argumentation but as grounded in reality, though some topics
more directly than others. As Mack writes, Agricola seems to believe that
‘‘connections between the terms of propositions’’ are grounded in ‘‘similar
connections really existing in the world’’: ‘‘The implication that the connec-
tions named by the topics exist in the world appears to suit some topics
(such as causes) better than others (such as similitudes).’’50 We might expect
therefore to find a rather fluid transition from speaking about the world to
speaking about the human mind that notices common aspects of things,
deriving from these features certain headings that direct the mind to notice
these aspects of reality.
We can see this bridge-function at work in treatises that deal with the
her translations with studies: Boethius’s ‘‘De topicis differentiis’’ (Ithaca: Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 1978) and Boethius’ ‘‘In Ciceronis Topica’’ (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1988); N. J. Green-Pedersen, The Tradition of the Topics in the Middle Ages (Munich:
Philosophia Verlag, 1984), 330 writes that ‘‘probably we must credit Agricola with a
rather original achievement,’’ but his conclusion that ‘‘Agricola is thinking in terms of
rhetoric and not logic when he writes about dialectic,’’ is far from adequate.
47 Mack, Renaissance Argument, 257–374.
48 Vives, De instrumento probabilitatis (M 3, 86–115).
49 De inventione dialectica, 22–24; cf. 24 where Agricola writes that his treatment of the
topics follows the ‘‘nature and order of things’’ (24).
50 Mack, Renaissance Argument, 140–41. For Agricola’s view see also Lodi Nauta,
‘‘From Universals to Topics: The Realism of Rudolph Agricola, with an Edition of his
Reply to a Critic,’’ Vivarium 50 (2012): 190–224.
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topics: De instrumento probabilitatis on topical invention, and a neglected
but interesting treatise on the predicables and definition, entitled De expla-
natione cuiusque essentiae. The latter treatise starts with a metaphor be-
tween nature and a pharmacist—a metaphor that we find used also in other
contexts: just as a pharmacist or a perfumer who has a box full of phials,
flasks, and bottles with labels on them identifying what they contain, so
nature ‘‘divides everything in small boxes [pixides] as it were with a name
on them, what they have in common: man, horse, adamant, pear, white-
ness, blackness, virtue, vice.’’51 Changing the metaphor, Vives compares
nature with a city. Just as there are families living in a big city, so things
that belong together (apples, horses) can be distinguished in nature. We
group things together on the basis of their similarity: ‘‘this essential simili-
tude is called a universal in the schools [in schola].’’52 While Vives follows
common tradition (see below), it is significant that he uses the same meta-
phor of the pharmacist’s or perfumer’s classification in De instrumento pro-
babilitatis but this time in order to refer to the topics rather than to the
things themselves: it is now the topics that are compared with labeled phials
and bottles.53 Though the use of the same metaphor might suggest an identi-
fication between topics and the real aspects of things, this is of course not
Vives’s intention. But because the topics as labels or headings under which
we are invited to view and discuss things are based on their common aspects
as noticed by the mind (e.g., essence, quality, cause, effect, and so on), the
association of things and topics facilitates an easy transition from reality to
the mind. Hence, the topics are a reflection of the ontological order and as
such an instrument and heuristic aid for the human mind. In searching for
similitudes between things, the mind detects common patterns and groups
things in categories. This is of course essential for argumentation, as Boe-
thius had already taught: to argue—to put it in its most rudimentary form—
that A is B (or not B) requires listing features of A and features of B, and
comparing the lists, finding a medium between A and B. Arguments thus
connect what is known with what is in doubt and needs proof. The same
list of topics can be used in every art and science, and can be of use to a
lawyer, physician, mathematician, or orator.54
51 De explanatione cuiusque essentiae (M 3:121). In Konrad Gesner we find the same
image (and many more other ones) to illustrate the commonplace-book as systematic
storage: ‘‘an apothecary’s shop with medicinal ingredients neatly stowed in separate con-
tainers’’ (Moss, Printed Commonplace-Books, 191).
52 Ibid.
53 De instrumento probabilitatis (M 3:86).
54 De instrumento probabilitatis (M 3:86); on argument as a medium of argumentation
see Agricola, De inventione dialectica, ed. Alardus, 7–8.
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This transition from the order of being to the order of knowing is per-
haps eased by Vives’s ambiguous use of the traditional word ‘‘similitude,’’
an ambiguity that we find in his predecessor Agricola, and also, arguably,
in many thinkers who were indebted to the classical account by Boethius.
In Boethius’s discussion universals seem to have a dual existence: they exist
both in particular things and as concepts in our mind.55 The mind abstracts
doghood after observing many dogs, noticing the similitude between them,
and forming the concept of doghood. The concept would be null and void
if there were nothing in extramental reality that corresponded to that con-
cept. But Boethius does not want to give up the Aristotelian principle that
everything that exists is one in number. Hence, universals must be said to
be particular as sensed in particular things—they might be identified with
the ‘‘likenesses’’ between things—but universal as grasped in thought.
Vives’s position comes close to the Boethian account but is probably
directly indebted to Agricola. Thus, on the one hand Vives, following tradi-
tion, equates similitudes with the inner essences of things, calling them
‘‘universals,’’ and saying that similitudes between things exist in reality,
independent of our thinking and linguistic expression (extra nomina atque
intelligentias nostras) ‘‘since the similitude is in the things themselves, or
rather the things themselves are similar and conforming to each other.’’56
This similitude can be called a ‘‘nature, manner, reason, form, or sign
[natura seu conditio seu ratio seu forma seu nota]’’ and ‘‘genus for wider
groups and species for smaller more limited groups.’’ On the other hand,
similitude also refers to what these essences, unknown to the human mind,
effect at the level of what is visible and knowable to the human mind: quali-
ties and actions. The similarities are what things have in common, and these
common features are ultimately caused by the inner essences.
Now for Vives this noticing of similarities is aided and structured by
the topics. The topics as ‘‘common headings’’ refer to the common condi-
tion of things: each thing belongs to a certain genus; has a certain substance;
is caused by something; has a certain effect; is at a certain place; and so on.
Thus, although the nature of individual things eludes us, we can observe
the similarities and differences between things: ‘‘there is nothing in nature
55 For a convenient text see Paul Vincent Spade, Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem
of Universals (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1994), 20–25; cf. John Marenbon, Boethius
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 23–32.
56 De explanatione (M 3:124): ‘‘. . . genus hoc aut species non modo in nominibus vel
nostris intelligentiis est situm, sed in natura rerum est ea similitudo ac communio, etiam
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which is not joined to something else by the bond of comparison [similitudi-
nis nodo].’’57 Inspired by Agricola, Vives sees the topics as a set of universal
aspects of things that help to bring order to the immense variety of nature.
But he is also taking over a certain ambiguity from Agricola’s account, an
account that he had helped to edit after Agricola’s death: topics are based
on the condition of things, yet they are not identical with them.58 The genus
animal in a horse, for instance, is not identical with the topic genus that has
led the mind to look for the type of genus in that horse, to be used in
argument. The yellowness that two things have in common is not the same
as the topic of ‘‘contingent’’ that has led the mind to look for common
accidents in these things. This close connection between topics and things
is also what causes the ambiguity in Vives’s account: as similitudes topics
are called the essences of things while they also are the set of categories that
organize the features we see.
We can now understand why scholars have found it difficult to charac-
terize Vives’s ontological position. On the one hand, he admits that the
agreements between things must be based on something that is independent
of human thinking and linguistic expression, ‘‘since the similitude is in the
things themselves, or rather the things themselves are similar and conform-
ing to each other’’ species and genus are not dependent on our categoriza-
tion (non modo in nominibus vel nostris intelligentiis).59 As we have seen,
Vives often speaks in terms of essences as hidden cores or natures of things.
But he also states that the world consists of individual substances and indi-
vidual accidents, and that generality in nature can be defined only in terms
of what we see as common element in different things. In his Against the
Pseudodialecticians Vives criticizes realists for confusing the metaphysical
and the physical order, and in the De anima et vita he also seems to side
explicitly with the nominalists when he writes that ‘‘there is no universal in
the imagination nor in nature; but it is only attained through discursive
reason [ratione discurrente] under a very confused and very thin image
when the mind strips itself off, as best as it can, from the attributes of
fantasy.’’60 Thus universal concepts are formed after careful and repeated
observation, guided by the grid of the topics, and yet they have a founda-
tion in reality. But this does not mean that the essence of a thing must be a
57 De instrumento probabilitatis (M 3:104).
58 See Alardus’s statement in the preface to Agricola’s little treatise on universals; De
inventione dialectica, 36. On the ambiguity see Nauta, ‘‘From Universals to Topics,’’ 213.
59 See note 56.
60 De anima et vita 2, 1 (M 3:344; ed. Sancipriano, De anima et vita, 222); cf. Casini,
Cognitive and Moral Psychology, 22–23.
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‘‘common’’ entity as if one and the same form of doghood would be
instantiated in many individual dogs. The dog Bello has a unique essence
that—through its effects in sensible qualities and actions—can be grouped
together with the dog Freddie that has its own singular essence revealing
qualities and actions very similar to those of Bello. Such a position comes
close to the Boethian account, which was certainly not without its own
ambiguities.
The topics aid us thus in categorizing things or aspects of things, but
they are also used by Vives to suggest a division of words: the way in which
we carve up reality suggests a division of words (distinctio nominum), e.g.,
words taken from the essence such as ‘‘man,’’ and ‘‘rationable’’; words
pointing to qualities such as ‘‘whiteness’’ and ‘‘blackness,’’ names derived
from these (‘‘white,’’ ‘‘black’’); words referring to the matter, or parts;
words that refer to qualities noticed by the exterior sense (‘‘whiteness,’’
‘‘laughing’’) or the interior sense (‘‘understanding,’’ ‘‘prone to laugh’’);
words referring to comparison or relation (‘‘father,’’ ‘‘son’’), or to manner
(‘‘crowned,’’ ‘‘armed’’); words referring to time and place, or to mixed
things, to things which are owned or which own (‘‘richness’’); words refer-
ring to action and passion, and so on. Vives realizes that the immense vari-
ety of words does not allow for any neat categorization. It might not be
impossible to put things ‘‘in certain boxes’’ or ‘‘assign to certain seats’’
(in certas sedes tribuere), but with words this seems impossible given ‘‘the
immense variety of words and of languages.’’61 Yet from Vives’s list it is not
difficult to recognize the topics that are not just aids in thinking but also in
making linguistic categories.
That such a linguistic division also reflects the workings of the topics
is not surprising. For if the topics structure what we consign to thought
(verbis sensa consignantur)—and we have seen that they indeed prompt us
to look for, for instance, causes, effects, or parts and whole, attributes, and
so on—it is likely that they are also reflected in language which is ‘‘the
expression of thought.’’ In some places Vives even suggests that ‘‘the power
of almost all knowing and understanding lies in words; for in words are
perceptions [sensa] registered, and all that takes place in the mind and in
thought is expressed in words.’’62 This does not mean that Vives endorses a
view that holds that language determines thought, but he is willing to see
the topics as an important grid that guides our knowledge and speech about
the world. What Peter Mack says of Agricola is true for Vives too: ‘‘All that
61 De explanatione (M 3:127): ‘‘in tanta licentia sermonis et tanta varietate linguarum.’’
62 De prima philosophia I (M 3:193).
PAGE 342
342
................. 18753$ $CH1 06-23-15 15:34:52 PS
Nauta ✦ Vives on Language, Thought, and the Topics
can be said about something, and all that something is, is to emerge from a
consideration of the topics,’’ and this ‘‘provides an explanation for the ways
in which the topics are to be used for discovering material and for
thought.’’63
VI. CONCLUSION
Vives’s ideas of language and knowledge, which testify to his wider views
on human culture, and his ideas on how this culture should be reformed by
education and learning, are clearly the product of his wide reading of
Cicero, Quintilian, Boethius, and many other classical sources and also his
direct predecessors Valla and Agricola. From these sources he distilled some
of the key ideas that I have discussed in this article. What Vives tried to
do—in line with his predecessors—is to place the world of concrete things
at the center of our attention, and to explore the world directly rather than
through what he thought was a superstructure of Scholastic concepts and
abstract terminology. Like Agricola he urges his students to study nature,
as well as the practical and mechanical arts, suggesting that they enter
‘‘shops and factories to ask questions from craftsmen, and get to know
about the details of their work.’’64 We have already noticed an emphasis on
empirical observation in Vives, and indeed some scholars have regarded
him as an empiricist or even a precursor of Francis Bacon.65 Though there is
surely an inquisitive spirit running through Vives’s works, learning remains
essentially a bookish affair: his vast encyclopedia of the arts lays down a
curriculum of reading. It is also not surprising that the pious Christian in
Vives frequently states that learning and also the study of nature are only
justifiable if they serve human society and religion. The pragmatic and prac-
tical overtones of his educational reform are there to curb the vainglorious
scientist or philosopher who pursues learning only for its own sake.
Although Vives’s ideas on language and knowledge did not contribute
directly to a program of natural study or empirical observation of nature,
one might see in his work an indirect contribution to the creation of an
intellectual climate that fostered such explorations. My discussion has
63 Mack, Renaissance Argument, 140–41.
64 De tradendis disciplinis 4, 6 (M 6:374, trans. Watson, Vives: On Education, 209; Del
Nero, L’insegnamento delle discipline, 176).
65 Cf. Watson, Vives: On Education, ciii–cxi; Angelo Crescini, Le origini del metodo ana-
litico: il cinquecento (Udine: Del Bianco, 1965), 77–78; Cesare Vasoli, La dialettica e la
retorica dell’Umanesimo (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1968), 635.
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pointed to what we may call a ‘‘de-essentialization’’ of universals, that is, a
move away from universals as entities that are one and many at the same
time, to be dug up by a process of abstraction, to topics as ordering princi-
ples that guide human cognition and argumentation. As for Agricola and
his sources, for Vives as well the topics reflect similarities in nature directly
or less directly.66 As system they may be said to form a grid through which
knowledge can be acquired and arguments formulated. It would be far from
the humanist’s mind to deny that there is a stable order of essences, inde-
pendent of human categorization, yet our knowledge of it can only be had
by way of inference on the basis of our seeing connections, and this process
of collecting and comparing data is guided (though not determined) by the
topics. As we have seen, the topics are a much broader group than the
traditional universals of genus, species, difference, and property, and hence
constitute a much more flexible set of categories, partly directly reflecting
the essential and accidental nature of a thing, and partly less directly when
we define a thing or have an opinion about it. They enable Vives thus to
suggest what we may call a horizontal ontology in which concrete things,
grouped in classes on the basis of what we empirically observe, rather than
hierarchies of universals such as genus and species somehow residing in
individual things though never identical with them, take center stage—a
line of thinking developed by Mario Nizolio (1488–1567), who often men-
tions Vives in his De veris principiis.67 We see a similar shift in Vives’s ideas
on the soul, studied in detail by other scholars. Here too the drift of his
argument moves away from a metaphysical consideration of the real nature
of the soul toward a description of its phenomenological manifestations.68
This is of course not an entirely new phenomenon in the sixteenth cen-
tury. Already in the later Middle Ages we see Scholastic thinkers turning
away from substance and essence and moving toward an examination—or
at least a defense of such an approach—of sensible qualities.69 But what we
can see in humanists such as Valla, Agricola, Vives, and Nizolio is that a
critique of philosophical abstraction goes hand in hand with a critique of
66 See note 63.
67 Nizolio, De veris principiis et vera ratione philosophandi contra pseudophilosophos,
ed. Q. Breen (2 vols., Rome: Bocca, 1956), index; Lodi Nauta, ‘‘Anti-essentialism and the
Rhetoricization of Knowledge: Mario Nizolio’s Humanist Attack on Universals,’’ Renais-
sance Quarterly 65 (2012): 31–66.
68 Already noticed by Wilhelm Dilthey, Weltanschauung und Analyse des Menschen seit
Renaissance und Reformation, in Gesammelte Schriften (Leipzig: Teubner, 1914), 2:423;
see Casini, Cognitive and Moral Psychology, 16, with further literature.
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linguistic abstraction. These humanists were certainly not alone nor the first
to warn against reification and hypostatization, but, equipped with their
linguistic and rhetorical training, they could argue that such reification, and
hence a belief in abstract entities, was caused by a misunderstanding of
language. A philosopher should have a good knowledge of language, for it
is ‘‘common meaning of words’’ rather than the technical terminology of
the Scholastics that should be followed (communis verborum usus; sensus
communis; verbis de vulgo sumtis).70 Even metaphysics is a discipline that
must take its starting-point from common usage, laying bare (enucleare) the
meaning of individual words, since ‘‘the rise and disappearance of nearly all
problems in the disciplines are dependent on the way we phrase them in
language.’’71 Vives’s appeal to common language and a plea for observing
the world of things are thus two sides of the same coin. When early modern
philosophers such as Descartes, Gassendi (who mentioned Vives explicitly
as one of the sources that helped him to break away from the ‘‘sect of
the Aristotelians’’),72 Hobbes, and Leibniz criticized Scholastic terminology,
while often reducing the Scholastics’ metaphysical apparatus, they were
doing something that was fully in line with the spirit of humanists such as
Valla and Vives.
University of Groningen.
70 De prima philosophia I (M 3:193).
71 Ibid.: ‘‘itaque diligenter communis verborum usus est animadvertendus, ex quo pluri-
mae in omnibus disciplinis et existunt quaestiones, et profligantur.’’
72 Exercitationes paradoxicae adversus Aristoteleos, in The Selected Works of Pierre Gas-
sendi, ed. and trans. Craig B. Brush (New York: Johnson, 1972), 18. In his Syntagma
philosophicum, Gassendi approves of Valla’s reduction of the Aristotelian categories;
Opera Omnia (Lyon, 1658), 1: 181b. For Leibniz’s engagement with Nizolio see Nauta,
‘‘Anti-essentialism and the Rhetoricization of Knowledge,’’ 60–62.
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